Abstract-In this paper, we investigate joint relay and jammer selection in two-way cooperative networks, consisting of two sources, a number of intermediate nodes, and one eavesdropper, with the constraints of physical-layer security. Specifically, the proposed algorithms select two or three intermediate nodes to enhance security against the malicious eavesdropper. The first selected node operates in the conventional relay mode and assists the sources to deliver their data to the corresponding destinations using an amplify-and-forward protocol. The second and third nodes are used in different communication phases as jammers in order to create intentional interference upon the malicious eavesdropper. First, we find that in a topology where the intermediate nodes are randomly and sparsely distributed, the proposed schemes with cooperative jamming outperform the conventional nonjamming schemes within a certain transmitted power regime. We also find that, in the scenario where the intermediate nodes gather as a close cluster, the jamming schemes may be less effective than their nonjamming counterparts. Therefore, we introduce a hybrid scheme to switch between jamming and nonjamming modes. Simulation results validate our theoretical analysis and show that the hybrid switching scheme further improves the secrecy rate.
Joint Relay and Jammer Selection for Secure Two-Way Relay Networks the wiretap channel and established fundamental results of creating perfectly secure communications without relying on private keys, physical-layer-based security has drawn increasing attention recently. The basic idea of physical-layer security is to exploit the physical characteristics of the wireless channel to provide secure communications. The security is quantified by the secrecy capacity, which is defined as the maximum rate of reliable information sent from the source to the intended destination in the presence of eavesdroppers.
Wyner showed that when the wiretap channel is a degraded version of the main channel, the source and the destination can exchange secure messages at a nonzero rate. The following research work [3] studied the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel, and [4] extended Wyner's approach to the transmission of confidential messages over broadcast channels. Very recently, physical-layer security has been generalized to investigate wireless fading channels [5] [6] [7] [8] , and various multiple access scenarios [9] [10] [11] [12] . Note the fact that if the source-wiretapper channel is stronger than the source-destination channel, the perfect secrecy rate will be zero [4] . Some work [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] has been proposed to overcome this limitation with the help of relay cooperation by cooperative relaying [13] , [14] , and cooperative jamming [15] [16] [17] . For instance, in [13] and [14] , the authors proposed effective decode-and-forward (DF) and amplify-and-forward (AF)-based cooperative relaying protocols for physical-layer security, respectively. Cooperative jamming is another approach to improve the secrecy rate by interfering the eavesdropper with codewords independent of the source messages. In Yener and Tekin's work [15] , a scheme termed collaborative secrecy was proposed, in which a nontransmitting user was selected to help increase the secrecy rate for a transmitting user by effectively "jamming" the eavesdropper. Following a similar idea as [15] , they first proposed cooperative jamming in [16] and [17] in order to increase achievable rates in the scenarios where a general Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel and two-way wiretap channel were assumed, respectively. The authors of [18] and [19] investigated the effects of user cooperation on the secrecy of broadcast channels by considering a cooperative relay broadcast channel, and showed that user cooperation can increase the achievable secrecy region. The study of communicating through unauthenticated intermediate relays between a source-destination pair started from Yener and He's work [20] [21] [22] . The relay channel with confidential messages was also investigated in [23] and [24] , where the untrusted relay node acts both as an eavesdropper and a conventional assistant relay. Two-way communication is a common scenario in which two nodes transmit information to each other simultaneously. Recently, the two-way relay channel [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] has attracted much interest from both academic and industrial communities, due to its bandwidth efficiency and potential application to cellular networks and peer-to-peer networks. In [25] and [26] , both AF and DF protocols for one-way relay channels were extended to the general full-duplex discrete two-way relay channel and half-duplex Gaussian two-way relay channel, respectively. In [27] , network and channel coding were used in the two-way relay channel to increase the sum-rate of two sources. The work in [28] introduced a two-way memoryless system with relays, in which the signal transmitted by the relay is obtained by applying an instantaneous relay function to the previously received signal in order to optimize the symbol error rate performance. As for secure communications, in [29] , Yener and He investigated the role of feedback in secrecy for two-way networks, and proved that the loss in secrecy rate when ignoring the feedback is very limited in a scenario with half-duplex Gaussian two-way relay channels and an eavesdropper.
It is well known that, in a cooperative communication network, proper relay/jammer selection can have a significant impact on the performance of the whole system. Several relay selection techniques [30] [31] [32] have been explored by far. The authors in [30] proposed a nonjamming relay selection scheme for two-way networks with multiple AF relays in an environment without eavesdroppers, which maximized the worse received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the two end users. In [31] , several relay selection techniques were proposed in one-way cooperative networks with secrecy constraints. In [32] , the authors investigated some relay selection techniques in a two-hop DF cooperative communication system with no central processing unit to optimally select the relay. Although cooperative networks have received much attention by far, the physical-layer security issues with secrecy constraints in two-way schemes have not yet been well investigated.
To this end, in this paper, we propose a scheme that can implement information exchange in the physical layer against eavesdroppers for two-way cooperative networks, consisting of two sources, a number of intermediate nodes, and one eavesdropper, with the constraints for physical-layer security. Unlike [30] , in which the relay selection is operated in an environment with no security requirement, our work takes into account the secrecy constraints. In contrast to [31] , where many relay selections based on the DF strategy for one-way cooperative wireless networks were proposed and a safe broadcasting phase was assumed, the problem we consider here involves a nonsecurity broadcasting phase, and the information is transferred bidirectionally.
Specifically, one node is selected from an intermediate node set to operate at a conventional relay mode, and then uses an AF strategy in order to assist the sources to deliver data to the corresponding destinations. Meanwhile, another two intermediate nodes that perform as jammers are selected to transmit artificial interference in order to degrade the eavesdropper links in the first and second phases of signal transmissions, respectively. We assume that both destinations cannot mitigate artificial interference, and thus, the jamming will also degrade the desired infor- mation channels. The principal question here is how to select the relay and the jammers in order to increase information security, and meanwhile protect the source messages against the eavesdropper. Several selection algorithms are proposed, aiming at promoting the assistance to the sources as well as the interference to the eavesdropper. The theoretical analysis and simulation results reveal that the proposed jamming schemes can improve the secrecy rate of the system by a large scale, but only within a certain transmitted power range. In some particular scenarios, the proposed schemes become less efficient than the conventional ones. We then propose a hybrid scheme with an intelligent switching mechanism between jamming and nonjamming modes to solve this problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model, and formulate the problem under consideration. In Section III, we propose several selection techniques, and introduce their hybrid implementations. In Section IV, we provide both quantitative analysis and qualitative discussions of different selection schemes in some typical configurations. Numerical results are shown in Section V, and the main conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
We assume a network configuration consisting of two sources and , one eavesdropper , and an intermediate node set with nodes. In Fig. 1 it schematically shows the system model. As the intermediate nodes cannot transmit and receive simultaneously (half-duplex assumption), the communication process is performed by two phases. During the first phase, and transmit their data to the intermediate nodes. In addition, according to the security protocol, one node is selected from to operate as a "jammer" and transmit intentional interference to degrade the source-eavesdropper links in this phase. Since the jamming signal is unknown at the rest nodes of , the interference will also degrade the performance of the source-relay links. During the second phase, according to the security protocol, an intermediate node, denoted by , is selected to operate as a conventional relay and forwards the source messages to the corresponding destinations. A second jammer is also selected from , for the same reason as that for . Note that and are not able to mitigate the artificial interference from the jamming nodes.
In both phases, a slow, flat, and block Rayleigh fading environment is assumed, i.e., the channel gain remains static for one coherence interval and changes independently in different coherence intervals with a variance , where denotes the Euclidean distance between node and node , and represents the path-loss exponent. The channel gain between node and node is denoted by , which is modeled as a zero-mean, independent, circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with variance . Furthermore, additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and unit variance is assumed. Let , , and denote the transmitted power for the source nodes, the relay node and the jamming nodes, respectively. In order to protect the destinations from severe artificial interference, the jamming nodes transmit with a lower power than the relay node [31] , and thus their transmitted power can be defined as , where denotes the power ratio of relay to jammer.
In the first phase, the two sources send information symbols and , respectively, which are mapped to a PSK set. The intermediate node and eavesdropper thus receive (1) (2) where and denote the noise at and , respectively. In the second phase, the intermediate node is selected to amplify its received signal and forward it to and , i.e., broadcasts (3) where . Since knows (for ), it can cancel the self-interference. Therefore, , , and get (4) (5) (6) where , , and represent the noise at , , and , respectively. Then, , defined as the overall signal to interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the virtual channel (for , ), can be calculated as (7) where represents the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of link (8) (9) (10) (11) Strictly speaking, in order to maximize the overall SINR of the eavesdropping links, the eavesdropper can perform whatever operations as it wishes with the signals received in the previous two phases. Here in this paper, we consider a simple case in which the eavesdropper applies maximal ratio combining (MRC) [34] , so as to examine the efficiency of the proposed jamming schemes. 1 According to MRC, combines the received signals by multiplying in (2) and in (6) with proper weighting factors and , respectively. Without loss of generality, consider the scenario in which intends to optimize the SINR of link , for , the combined eavesdropping signal can be written as (12) where (13 which denotes an average channel knowledge for the eavesdropping links.
With the assumption of , we can get the instantaneous SNR of any channel in the system. Thus, the SINR of link can be calculated as (22) In an environment where the instantaneous channel knowledge set is not available, we can use the expectation of SNRs for the eavesdropping links , which is provided by the average channel knowledge , to get the SINRs (23) where stands for the expectation operator.
B. Problem Formulation
The instantaneous secrecy rate with the node set for source can be expressed as [35] (24) where , , , and . The overall secrecy performance of the system is characterized by the ergodic secrecy rate which is the expectation of the sum of the two sources' secrecy rate, , where
Our objective is to select appropriate nodes , , and , in order to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rate subject to different types of channel feedback. The optimization problem can be formulated as (26) where , , , and denote the selected relay and jamming nodes, respectively. Note that here the selected jammers and in the two phases may be the same node, which is determined by the instantaneous secrecy rate.
C. Selection Without Jamming
In a conventional cooperative network, the relay scheme does not have the help from jamming nodes. We derive the following solutions under this scenario.
1) Conventional Selection (CS):
The conventional selection does not take the eavesdropper channels into account, and the relay node is selected according to the instantaneous SNR of the channel between node and node only. Therefore, the SINR given in (7) becomes (27) where represents the SINR of the virtual channel (for , ) without considering the eavesdropper. Hence, the conventional selection scheme can be expressed as (28) with and for ( , ) given by (8) and (11), respectively. Since (28) shows that this selection does not consider the eavesdropping links, the CS scheme may not be able to support systems with secrecy constraints even though it may be effective in noneavesdropper environments.
2) Optimal Selection (OS):
This solution takes the eavesdropper into account and selects the relay node based on , which provides the instantaneous channel knowledge for all the links. Then, the SINR of link in (22) can be rewritten as (29) The optimal selection scheme is given as (30) where (31) 3) Suboptimal Selection (SS): The suboptimal selection implements the relay selection based on the knowledge set , which gives the average estimate of the eavesdropping links. Therefore, it avoids the difficulty of getting instantaneous estimate of channel feedback. Similar to the OS scheme in (30) , the suboptimal selection scheme can be written as (32) where (33) (34) Note that in comparison of the OS scheme in (30), the only difference of the SS scheme in (32) is that it requires the average channel state information which would be more useful in practice.
III. SELECTIONS WITH JAMMING IN TWO-WAY RELAY SYSTEMS
In this section, we present several node selection techniques based on the optimization problem given by (26) in the two-way system. Unlike [31] , where the selection techniques only concern the secrecy performance in the second phase of transmission, here, our work takes into account both the two phases in order to select a set of relay and jammers that can maximize the overall expectation of secrecy rate.
A. Optimal Selection With Maximum Sum Instantaneous Secrecy Rate (OS-MSISR)
The optimal selection with maximum sum instantaneous secrecy rate assumes a knowledge set and ensures a maximization of the sum of instantaneous secrecy rate of node and node given in (25) , which gives credit to (35) where and are given by (7) and (22), respectively. The approach in (35) reflects the basic idea of using both cooperative relaying and cooperative jamming in order to promote the system's secrecy performance. Specifically, the OS-MSISR scheme here tends to select a set of relay and jammers that maximizes , which means promoting the assistance to the sources. Meanwhile, this relay and jammer set tends to minimize , which is equivalent to enhance the interference to the eavesdropper.
Although the OS-MSISR scheme seems to be a straightforward application for cooperative relaying and cooperative jamming, the actual selection procedure usually involves trade-offs. For instance, according to (7) and (9), we should select the relay and jammer set that minimizes in order to make as high as possible. Considering (19) , (20) , and (22), however, the lower is, the higher is, which is undesirable. Thus, we have to make a trade-off between raising and inhibiting in order to optimize the right part of (35) .
B. Optimal Selection With Max-Min Instantaneous Secrecy Rate (OS-MMISR)
It is obvious that the OS-MSISR scheme in (35) is complicated; thus, in this subsection, we propose a reduced-complexity algorithm. It is common that the sum secrecy rate of the two sources, i.e.,
, may be driven down to a low level by the source with the lower secrecy rate. As a result, for low complexity, the intermediate nodes, which maximize the minimum secrecy rate of the two sources, can be selected to achieve the near-optimal performance. In addition, in some scenarios, the considered secrecy performance takes into account not only the total secrecy rate of both the sources, but also the individual secrecy rate of each one. If one source has a low secrecy rate, the whole system is regarded as secrecy inefficient. Furthermore, assuring each individual source a high secrecy rate is another perspective of increasing the whole system's secrecy performance. The OS-MMISR scheme maximizes the worse instantaneous secrecy rate of the two sources with the assumption of knowledge set , and we can get (36) where and are given by (7) and (22), respectively.
C. Optimal Switching (OSW)
The original idea of using jamming nodes is to introduce interference on the eavesdropping links. However, there are two side-effects of using jamming. Such as the jamming node in the second phase , it also poses undesired interference directly onto the destinations. Given the assumption that the destinations cannot mitigate this artificial interference, continuous jamming in both phases is not always beneficial for the whole system. In some specific situations (e.g., is close to one destination), the continuous jamming may decrease the secrecy rate of both the sources seriously, and act as a bottleneck for the system. In order to overcome this problem, we introduce the idea of intelligent switching between the OS-MSISR and OS schemes in order to reduce the impact of "negative interference." The threshold for the involvement of the jamming nodes is where , , , and are given by (7), (22), (31) , and (29), respectively.
For each time slot, if (39) is met, the OS-MSISR scheme provides higher instantaneous secrecy rate than the OS scheme does and is preferred. Otherwise, the OS scheme is more efficient in promoting the system's secrecy performance, which should be employed. Because of the uncertainty of the channel coefficient for each channel , the OSW scheme should outperform either the continuous jamming schemes or the nonjamming ones.
D. Suboptimal Selection With Maximum Sum Instantaneous Secrecy Rate (SS-MSISR)
With the assumption of , we can get some optimal selection metrics. However, its practical interest and potential implements are only limited to some special (e.g., military) applications, where the instantaneous quality of the eavesdropping links can be measured by some specific protocols. In practice, only an average knowledge of these links would be available from long-term eavesdropper supervision. The selection metrics is modified as (40) where and are given by (7) and (23), respectively. From (40), we can predict that for a scenario in which the intermediate nodes are sparsely distributed across the considered area, the SS-MSISR scheme can provide similar relay and jammer selection performance with the OS-MSISR scheme. This is because a slight difference between provided by and provided by would not be enough for the scheme to select another faraway intermediate node.
Thus, under this condition, the average eavesdropper channel knowledge set may contain sufficient channel information as well for a quasi-optimal selection.
E. Suboptimal Selection With Max-Min Instantaneous Secrecy Rate (SS-MMISR)
This scheme refers to the practical application of the above selection with maximizing worse instantaneous secrecy rate in (36). The basic idea of considering as the average behavior of the eavesdropping links is the same as the SS-MSISR scheme, but aimed at looking for the maximum worse instantaneous secrecy rate, which is written as (41) where and are given by (7) and (23), respectively.
F. Suboptimal Switching (SSW)
Given the fact that jamming is not always a positive process for the performance of the system, the suboptimal switching scheme refers to the practical application of the intelligent switching between the SS-MSISR and SS schemes. The basic idea is the same as the OSW scheme, but the switching criterion uses the available knowledge set . More specifically, the required condition for switching from SS-MSISR to SS mode is (42) where , , , and are given by (7), (23), (33) , and (34), respectively.
G. Optimal Selection With "Known" Jamming (OSKJ)
The previous selection techniques are proposed based on the assumption that the jamming signal is unknown at both destinations. This assumption avoids the initialization period in which the jamming sequence is defined, and thus, it reduces the risk of giving out the artificial interference to the eavesdropper. For comparison reasons, here we propose a "control" scheme, in which the jamming signal can be decoded at destinations and , but not at eavesdropper . In this case, the SINR of the link from (for ) to remains the same as given by (22) . The SINR of the link from to (for , ) is modified as follows: (43) The OSKJ scheme is taken into consideration in the numerical results section as a reference. This, however, is not the "ideal" jamming scheme since the artificial interference from the jammers only degrades the eavesdropping links. As we have discovered and will discuss in Section V, in some particular scenarios, the OSKJ scheme is outperformed by the OSW and SSW schemes presented above, for the jamming has changed the value of given in (3).
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first do some quantitative analysis on the asymptotic performance of both the proposed jamming and nonjamming schemes in high transmitted power range. Then, we provide a qualitative discussion of the secrecy performance of different selection schemes in some typical scenarios based on the system model in Section II.
A. Asymptotic Performance for Selections Without Jamming
Without loss of generality, we take the OS scheme for example. With high transmitted power , we can get
We can see that grows rapidly as increases, while converges to a value that depends only on the relative distances between the sources and the eavesdropper as well as the sources and the relay. Therefore, the ergodic secrecy rate also increases rapidly with the transmitted power . Based on (44) and (45), the slope of the versus curve (measured by decibels) can be approximately calculated as (46) For the other nonjamming schemes (i.e., CS and SS), we note that they share the same asymptotic performance as the OS scheme with a linear increment of slope about 0.3322 as the transmitted power increases.
B. Asymptotic Analysis for Selections With Continuous Jamming
We use the same method as in the previous analysis for the nonjamming schemes to analyze the asymptotic performance of the proposed jamming schemes. As the transmitted power increases to a relatively high value, it yields (47) and (48), shown at the bottom of the page.
It is clear that both and are independent of , which means that for high , the ergodic secrecy rate stops increasing and converges to a fixed value. Consider the asymptotic performance of the OS scheme that grows linearly with the increment of as described in (46); it is safe to predict that there will be a crossover point between the ergodic secrecy rate v.s. transmitted power curve with jamming and the one with nonjamming. In the power range below , the jamming scheme outperforms the nonjamming one, while above this point, the jamming scheme loses its advantage in providing higher ergodic secrecy rate.
We note that the analysis above can apply to any scheme with continuous jamming (i.e., OS-MSISR, OS-MMISR, SS-MSISR, and SS-MMISR), which indicates that they share the same asymptotic behavior as increases. In other words, the proposed selection techniques (except for OSW and SSW) behave better than the nonjamming schemes only within a certain transmitted power range. Fortunately, in a practical case, is always limited in a relatively low range and will not increase infinitely.
C. Secrecy Performance With Sparsely Distributed Intermediate Nodes
This is a common configuration in which eavesdropper has similar distances with two sources and and the intermediate nodes spread randomly within the considered area. With a relatively far distance in between, the interference link between and becomes weak. As predicted in the previous subsection, within a certain transmitted power range (less than the crossover point ), the selection schemes with continuous jamming are able to provide a higher ergodic secrecy rate than the nonjamming ones. This gain proves the introduction of jamming in selection schemes as an effective technique. Outside this range, the secrecy rate of the conventional nonjamming schemes continue to grow with a slope of 0.3322 as verified in (46), whereas those of the continuous jamming schemes converge to a fixed value. Inside this scope, the continuous jamming schemes lose their efficiency in providing a better secrecy performance for the system.
We note that in some particular scenarios, the system's integrated secrecy performance is not measured by the sum of the sources' secrecy rate, but by the minimum secrecy rate of the sources in the system. In this situation, the OS-MMISR and SS-MMISR schemes can optimize the overall secrecy performance of the whole system. For the hybrid schemes, the OSW and SSW schemes are able to provide better secrecy performance in the whole transmitted power scope, since it overcomes the bottleneck caused by negative interference on the relay-destination links.
D. Secrecy Performance With a Close Cluster of the Intermediate Nodes
Under the condition that all the intermediate nodes are located very close to each other, we note that the continuous jamming selections will lose their efficiency in meeting the secrecy constraints. Specifically, we will discuss two extreme situations in which the intermediate nodes cluster is near to one of the destinations, and to the eavesdropper, respectively.
1) Intermediate Nodes Cluster Locates Near to One of the Destinations:
There are two reasons that make the proposed continuous jamming schemes inefficient. First, the nodes of the relay/jammer cluster gather too close to each other, such that the selected jammer in the first phase has too much negative impact on the selected relay , which further decreases the SINRs in the second phase. Second, the jamming signal from in the second phase also has an overly strong interference on the destination it stays close to.
2) Intermediate Nodes Cluster Locates Near to the Eavesdropper:
Aside from the first reason presented above, in this configuration, the direct link between relay and eavesdropper gets too strong, which will seriously sabotage the secrecy performance of the continuous jamming schemes.
(47) (48) On the other hand, the hybrid schemes (i.e., OSW and SSW) will still be the most effective ones in this configuration, since the system's secrecy performance considered here is measured by the ergodic secrecy rate.
E. Secrecy Performance With the Eavesdropper Near to One of the Source Nodes
This is the situation in which eavesdropper
can get the communicating information most easily, since the direct link between and any one of the sources is strong, which makes the introduction of jamming very necessary. The jamming schemes should be efficient within quite a large power range, and the hybrid schemes should still perform as the best selection techniques within the whole power scope.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide computer simulations in order to validate the analysis in the previous section. The simulation environment consists of two sources and , one eavesdropper , and an intermediate node cluster with nodes. All the nodes are located in a 2-D square topology within a 1 1 unit square. For simplicity, we assume that the sources and the relay transmit with the same power, i.e., , while the jammers transmit with a power subject to the relay-jammer power ratio , i.e., . As assumed in Section II, the power of the AWGN is . The path-loss exponent is set to . In this paper, the adopted performance metric is the ergodic secrecy rate. Meanwhile, some results are also provided in terms of the secrecy outage probability , where denotes probability, and is the target secrecy rate. First, we consider a scenario where , , and are located at , , and , respectively. The intermediate nodes spread randomly within the square space, as shown in Fig. 2 . Fig. 3 shows the ergodic secrecy rate versus the transmitted power of different selection schemes. We can observe that the selection schemes with jamming outperform their nonjamming counterparts within a certain transmitted power range ( , dB), where the ergodic secrecy rate of OS-MSISR is approximately higher than that of OS by 1 bit per channel use (BPCU). Outside this range , the ergodic secrecy rate of OS-MSISR converges to a power-independent value which is approximately 4.1 BPCU, whereas the ergodic secrecy rate of OS continues to grow with a slope of 0.3322, as proved in (46). This validates the secrecy performance analysis in Section IV. In addition, we can see that in this topology, the suboptimal schemes (e.g., SS-MSISR and SS-MMISR) which are based on average channel knowledge perform almost the same as the corresponding optimal ones (e.g., OS-MSISR and OS-MMISR), which implies that in this configuration where the intermediate nodes are sparsely distributed, an average channel knowledge may also provide enough information in order to get optimal relay and jammer selection.
In Fig. 3 , a comparison between OS-MSISR and OS-MMISR shows that OS-MSISR has slightly higher ergodic secrecy rate by about 0.25 BPCU than OS-MMISR does corresponding to the transmitted power . The same comparison result can be observed from SS-MSISR and SS-MMISR, which matches our previous analysis. Furthermore, it can be seen that OSW performs better than any other selection techniques with or without continuous jamming. At a low power range where , OSW performs slightly better than OS-MSISR, but much better than OS (by about 1.2 BPCU), for the reason that in this range continuous jamming is almost always needed. After grows much higher than , OSW outperforms both the other two schemes by a large scale. For the suboptimal case, we can see that SSW provides almost the same performance as OSW in this topology, which validates the practical value of this hybrid scheme. An observation of the performance of OSKJ shows that it outperforms all the other selection techniques, providing the highest ergodic secrecy rate when the transmitted power increases due to its ability of the destinations to decode the artificial interference in this OSKJ scheme.
Within this configuration, we also compare the performance of different selection techniques measured by the secrecy outage probability, as shown in Fig. 4 . The target secrecy rate is set as 0.2 BPCU. It can be seen that the selection schemes with jamming provides lower secrecy outage probability within a certain transmitted power range ( , dB). Outside this range, the conventional selection scheme without jamming achieves better secrecy outage probability. Regarding the hybrid schemes, OSW outperforms the nonswitching selection techniques.
In Fig. 5 , it deals with a configuration where the intermediate nodes cluster, which also includes nodes, is located close to one of the two destinations (e.g., node , without loss of generality). We can see that the ergodic secrecy rate of the proposed selection schemes in this topology differs greatly from those in the previous configuration. We observe that the continuous jamming schemes (i.e., OS-MSISR, OS-MMISR, SS-MSISR, and SS-MMISR) are inefficient here, which converge to less than 0.5 BPCU, validating our discussions in Section IV. On the other hand, OSW and SSW still outperform all the other selection techniques by quite a large scale (more than 4 BPCU) when is very high, as shown in Fig. 5 . We also note that in this topology, OSW and SSW perform even better than OSKJ, which seems to be an interesting result. Further investigation reveals that the involvement of jammer in OSKJ causes a different value of compared with that of OSW and SSW, which results in a lower secrecy rate in OSKJ than in OSW and SSW. This indicates that the proposed OSW/SSW schemes may perform even better than the "ideal" case where the destinations can mitigate the artificial interference. All of these validate the value of the selection techniques with intelligent switching in potential practical use.
In Fig. 6 , we set the intermediate nodes cluster close to eavesdropper . Here the continuous jamming schemes also perform worse than the nonjamming ones in most of the transmitted power range. It also shows that the range that the continuous jamming schemes perform better than the nonjamming ones in this topology is slightly larger than that of the previous one. Regarding to the hybrid schemes, OSW and SSW still perform as the best selection techniques in providing the highest secrecy rate.
Finally, we place eavesdropper near to one of the two sources (e.g., ) to examine the results. The location of eavesdropper is set to (0,0.5), and the intermediate nodes spread randomly across the considered rectangle area, as shown in the inset of Fig. 7 . We get a similar simulation result with that of the first configuration, in which eavesdropper has the same distance to and . The nonjamming schemes (i.e., CS, OS, and SS) here are less effective in promoting the secrecy performance. On the contrary, the selection techniques with continuous jamming (i.e., OS-MSISR, OS-MMISR, SS-MSISR, and SS-MMISR) provide a much higher secrecy rate in a large transmitted power range dB . Within this power range, the hybrid schemes (i.e., OSW and SSW) perform slightly better than the continuous jamming schemes because jamming is almost always needed in this configuration. Outside this regime, where the nonjamming schemes perform better, the difference between the intelligent switching and continuous jamming schemes increases and the hybrid schemes still perform as the most efficient ones.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has studied joint relay and jammer selection in two-way cooperative networks with physical-layer security consideration. The proposed schemes achieve an opportunistic selection of one conventional relay node and one (or two) jamming nodes to enhance security against eavesdroppers based on both instantaneous and average knowledge of the eavesdropper channels. The selected relay node helps the information transmission between the two sources in an AF strategy, while the jamming nodes are used to produce intentional interference at the eavesdropper in different transmission phases. We found that the proposed jamming schemes (i.e., OS-MSISR, OS-MMISR, SS-MSISR, and SS-MMISR) are effective within a certain transmitted power range for scenarios with the intermediate nodes sparsely distributed. Meanwhile, the nonjamming schemes (i.e., CS, OS, and SS) are preferred in configurations where the intermediate nodes are confined close to each other. The OSW scheme which switches intelligently between jamming and nonjamming modes is very efficient in providing the highest secrecy rate in almost the whole transmitted power regime in two-way cooperative networks, but it requires an instantaneous eavesdropper channel knowledge. On the other hand, the SSW scheme, which is based on the average knowledge of the eavesdropper channel and thus much more practical, provides a comparable secrecy performance with the OSW scheme.
